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Abstract
This paper seeks to examine the effect of employment protection on income inequality. By employing the
employment protection data developed by Botero et al. (2004) as well as well established measures of
economic inequality for a sample of 83 countries, our analysis suggests that increased employment protection
is negatively associated with income inequality. This relationship remains highly robust across several different
specifications and estimation methods. In addition, our analysis places the spotlight on the role of the
informal economy and investigates how the presence of informal sector may affect the above mentioned
relationship. Our results suggest that in the presence of a large unofficial economy the negative impact of
employment protection on inequality is crucially mitigated and in some extreme cases may also be reversed.
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1. Introduction
Recent decades have seen a rise in income inequality, an aspect of which, 
apart from the labour share and unemployment rate, refers to changes in the 
distribution of earnings (Checci and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005). More unequal wages 
imply increased demand for social security as a mean to maintain the standards of 
living and reduce uncertainty. 
Government regulation in the labour market appears to be one prevalent 
policy to reduce the wage inequality (see e.g. Checci and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005;
Piketty and Saez, 2006; Lemieux, 2008).  Rama (2001a, 2003) claims that labor 
institutions are supposed to increase redistribution and specifically shows that 
social security programs help reduce income inequality in a stronger way than 
collective bargaining do. Saint-Paul (1994) investigates the effect of minimum 
wages and finds that they have a small or even adverse impact on income 
distribution relative to other protection policies.1 According to Olson (1965), laws 
are shaped by the influence of interest groups which exert their power to 
redistribute income to themselves, increasing in this income inequality.
In this paper, we seek to examine the effect of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) on income inequality.  Moreover, we investigate whether this 
relationship is affected by the magnitude of the informal sector within each 
country. To this end, we build a cross section dataset of 83 -developed and 
developing- countries where the dependent variable is income inequality and the 
key explanatory variable is alternative proxies of employment protection. In order 
to capture income inequality, we rely on two alternative inequality databases and 
we employ two alternative variables of income inequality. More precisely, we 
employ: (i) the Gini coefficient developed by the Texas University Inequality 
Project (2003) and (ii) the Gini coefficient developed by Solt (2009). Concerning 
the data on employment protection, we rely on the dataset developed by Botero et 
al. (2004). The basic advantage of the Botero et al. (2004) dataset is that it 
quantifies qualitative characteristics of the labour market’s legislation for 85 -
developed and developing- countries and therefore allows us to investigate the 
impact of employment protection in countries that differ substantially in terms of 
economic development and institutional quality.
Our results suggest that increased employment protection is negatively 
associated with income inequality. This relationship remains highly robust across 
several different specifications, data and estimation methods. Moreover, when we 
investigate the impact of unofficial economy on the above mentioned relationship, 
                                                
1 Rama (2001b) provide empirical evidence that doubling of minimum wages in real terms in 
Indonesia, over the early 1990s, in a period with roughly elasticity of average wages to minimum 
wages associated with a mild decline in total wage employment and an increase in unemployment 
substantial in small establishments.
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our analysis provide evidence that in the presence of a large unofficial economy 
the negative impact of employment protection on inequality is crucially mitigated 
and in some extreme cases may also be reversed. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows; in Section 2, we present the 
theoretical considerations upon which we base our empirical analysis on; in 
Section 3, we discuss the empirical methodology and the data; in Section 4 we
present the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical Considerations
2.1. The effect of employment protection legislation on income inequality
The theoretical literature on labour market regulation and income inequality 
has been focused at the role the institutions and labour market policies (e.g. 
Emerson and Dramais, 1988; Rama, 2001a, 2003) such as the union coverage
(e.g. Burniaux et al., 2006; Checci and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005) and the setting of 
the minimum wage (DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999; Dickens et al., 1999;
Koeninger et al, 2007) , play in formatting the distribution of earnings.
From a theoretical point of view, the effect of changing employment 
protection legislation (EPL) on income inequality is ambiguous. This is because 
the overall effect is dependent on two contrasting channels: (i) the effect of EPL 
on the employment rate and (ii) the effect of EPL on the earnings inequality 
among the entire working age population (i.e. inequality between workers and 
non-workers or between full time and part-time workers).  
The impact of changing EPL on the employment rate is difficult to be 
predicted theoretically since it depends crucially on the extent to which the extra 
cost can be shifted onto workers from employers. In addition, a decline in EPL 
may reduce the cost of employment adjustment (both hiring and firing) and as a 
result may lead to little change in the aggregate employment rate if both inflows 
to and outflows from employment tend to cancel each other out. A large number 
of empirical studies suggest that the effect of changing EPL has insignificant 
effect on employment rate (see e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005; Bassanini and 
Duval, 2006) whereas others, highlight a negative and highly significant effect of 
changing specific forms of EPL on the employment rate (see e.g. Nickell, 1997; 
Layard et al. , 1991; OECD, 2011).  
On the other hand, increased EPL tends to protect unskilled workers more 
than skilled workers due to a substantial fixed-cost component (Boeri et al., 
2006). Thus, a weakening of employment protection, in particular the 
liberalisation of temporary contracts, is expected to contribute to higher wage 
inequality. Previous empirical studies examining the effect of EPL on the earnings 
inequality among the entire working age population  conclude that weakening of 
2
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EPL leads to significantly higher earning inequality (see e.g. Koeninger et al., 
2007; Visser and Cecchi, 2009; OECD, 2011). 
Given that theoretical literature appears to be inconclusive concerning the
overall effect of changing employment protection legislation (EPL) on income 
inequality, our analysis will proceed by placing the spotlight on the empirical 
aspects of this relationship and then “leave the data tell the story”. This will be 
done by estimating a standard inequality equation in which we employ as key 
explanatory variables various alternative employment protection legislation 
measures. Summarizing the above described theoretical considerations we 
conclude that stricter employment protection legislation (EPL) is expected to exert 
a positive impact on income inequality when the effect of EPL on wages 
dispersion prevails, whereas is expected to exert a negative impact when the
corresponding effect on the unemployment rate appears to be larger. 
2.2. The impact of the informal sector on employment protection-income 
inequality nexus.
A substantial part of the economic activity, in both developing and developed 
countries, takes place in the informal sector.2 The existence of unofficial economy 
generates malfunctions in the operation of the markets and distorts crucially the 
results of implemented policies (see e.g. Cuff et al., 2011; Almeida and Carneiro; 
2007). In this paper, we focus on the relationship between employment protection 
legislation and income inequality and we seek to examine how the existence of 
informal sector within an economy may affect the above mentioned relationship. 
The consequences of EPL on labour market outcomes are a constant source of 
controversy in the literature. As a result of increased protection, formal jobs 
become more expensive for the firms and this generates an incentive for the 
entrepreneurs to move to the informal sector (see e.g. Cuff et al., 2011; Dabla-
Norris et al, 2008). The contraction of demand for labour in the formal sector and 
the corresponding increase in demand in the informal sector affects both the wage 
dispersion and the employment in the formal sector and therefore is expected also 
to affect the overall effect of EPL on income inequality.3 Since the overall effect 
is dependent on several theoretical assumptions concerning the structure of the 
labour market as well as the form of labour demand on the formal and the 
informal sector, we choose to proceed by focusing on the empirical aspects of this 
                                                
2 Based on recent estimates of Schneider et al. (2010) informal economic activity –in most 
developing countries-exceeds the 50% of the total economic activity.
3 Another strand of the literature underlines the importance of increased enforcement of mandated 
benefits on the willingness to be employed on the formal sector and therefore to labour supply in 
the formal sector (see e.g. Harris and Todaro, 1970; Fields 1975; Almeida and Carneiro, 2007). 
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relationship and by testing whether (and how) the above relationship is indeed 
affected by the presence of unofficial economy within a country. 
Summarizing the above described theoretical considerations we conclude that: 
the existence of unofficial economy affects both the wage dispersion and the 
employment in the formal sector and therefore is expected to affect the overall 
effect of EPL on income inequality.
3. Empirical Model and Data
3.1 Econometric Model
The empirical model used to study the relationship employment protection and 
inequality is as follows:
0 1   i i k i i iInequality EmplProt controls geographical dummies u       (1)
where income inequality in country i, is expressed as a function of employment 
protection, a set of control variables, geographical dummies and a stochastic term 
ui. To estimate Eq. (1) we build a cross section dataset of 83 –developed and 
developing- countries. The dependent and explanatory variables are discussed 
below. Explicit definitions, descriptive statistics and sources for the variables 
employed are provided in Appendices A and B.  
3.2. The data
3.2.1 Inequality measures
In order to capture income inequality, we rely on two alternative inequality 
databases and we employ two alternative proxies of income inequality. More 
precisely, we employ: (i) the Gini coefficient developed by the Texas University 
Inequality Project (2003) (denoted as Tex_Gini) and (ii) the Gini coefficient 
developed by Solt (2009) (denoted as Gini_Solt). Note that Tex_Gini is average 
over the period 1990-2002 whereas Gini_Solt is average over the period 1990-
2005.
The Texas Gini coefficient measures the industrial wage inequality, its source of 
data is the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and covers the years 
from 1970 to 2002. It is based on manufacturing wage information compiled by 
UNIDO and is available for 156 countries. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect 
equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.  However, when 
focusing on a greater coverage across countries and over time using this dataset 
we have to pay the cost of a reduced comparability across observations. The Gini 
4
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coefficient developed by Solt (2009) refers to the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) and overcomes this limitation.4 The SWIID 
provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 153 
countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present along with 
estimates of uncertainty in these statistics. 
3.2.2 Employment Protection Legislation measures
In order to control for employment protection, we rely on the dataset 
developed by Botero et al. (2004). The basic advantage of the Botero et al. (2004) 
dataset is that it quantifies qualitative characteristics of the labour market’s 
legislation for 85 different countries. The measures of labour regulation deal with 
three broad areas: (i) employment laws, (ii) collective relations laws and (iii) 
social security laws. 
In this study we focus exclusively on the “Employment Laws” area and we 
examine how the employment protection legislation affects income inequality.5
More precisely, we employ the general employment laws index developed by 
Botero et al. (2004) (denoted as labour_index) as key explanatory variable. We 
also employ the four sub-indices of labour_index summarizing different 
dimensions of such protection. Specifically, we employ: (i) the alternative 
employment contracts index (denoted as altern_contract) which measures the 
existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employment contract, (ii) the 
cost of increasing hours worked index (denoted as cost_overtimen) which 
measures the cost of increasing the number of hours worked, (iii) the cost of firing 
workers (cost_firing) which measures the cost of firing the 20 percent of the 
firm’s workers and (iv) the dismissal procedures measure (index_dism) which 
measures the worker protection granted by law or mandatory collective 
agreements against dismissal.6
                                                
4 It standardizes the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database and other 
inequality data while minimizing reliance on problematic assumptions by using as much 
information as possible from proximate years within the same country; having the data collected 
by the Luxembourg Income Study as the standard. (Solt, 2009)
5 The Botero et al. (2004) dataset contains also data related to the “Collective or industrial 
relations laws” that regulate the bargaining, adoption and enforcement of collective agreements, 
the organization of trade unions and the industrial action by workers and employers as well as data 
related to the  “Social security laws” that contemplate the social response to quality-of-life 
conditions and requirements.
6 For more details about the methodology employed by Botero et al. (2004) in order to construct 
these variables see Appendix A. For Summary Statistics of these variables see Appendix B.
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3.2.3. Control variables
To ensure robust econometric identification, we use a number of control 
variables in the estimated equations. Our set of controls follows the empirical 
literature on income distribution (see e.g. Dreher and Gaston, 2006; Barro and 
Lee, 2000). More precisely, we include the level of GDP per capita (denoted as 
gdppercap) as a handy proxy for structural determinants correlated with levels of 
income, the government spending as a share of GDP (denoted as govspend) that 
includes all government consumption, investment but excludes transfer payments 
made by the state. In addition we include the primary school enrolment 
(primschool) as a share of the population of official primary education age, the 
secondary school enrolment (secschool) as a percentage of the population of 
official secondary education age and the tertiary school enrolment (tertschool) as 
a percentage of the population of official tertiary education age. Finally, we 
control for the effects of international market integration by including the ratio of 
imports plus exports to GDP (denoted as openness). Note that all data are obtained 
from the World Development Indicators Database (2010) and that our explanatory 
variables are averages over the period 1980-2004. 
4. Estimation and Results
In the following subsections we discuss the results obtained by working as 
above. These are reported in Tables 1 to 5. 
4.1 Testing the effect of employment protection on income inequality
We start by estimating equation (1) presented in section 3.1, using the data 
and the empirical methodology outlined in the previous section. The results are 
reported in Table 1. 
[Table 1, here]
In columns (1) to (4), Table 1, Tex_Gini is regressed on index_labour as well 
as on a set of control variables (i.e. gdppercap, publspend, primschool, secschool, 
tertschool, openness).  Note that we present t-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors. As can be seen, index_labour enters with a negative and highly 
significant coefficient which remains virtually unchanged in all four alternative 
specifications. This result indicates the negative effect of increased employment 
protection on income inequality. This finding appears to be in accordance with the 
theoretical priors driven from the literature which concludes that stricter 
employment protection laws increase employers’ costs to hire  or dismiss workers 
6
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and raise the reservation wage of the unemployed, eventually compressing the 
wage differential7 (OECD, 2011)  and that employment protection is significantly 
associated with the evolution of wage inequality, as a reduction of employment 
protection by one standard deviation is associated with a 19-20% higher wage 
differential (Koeninger et al., 2007).8
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, we observe that 
all of them bear the expected -by the theory- sign. Specifically, gdppercap enters 
with a negative and statistically significant coefficient which remains intact to all 
alternative specifications. This finding reflects the tendency of a negative 
relationship between income inequality and GDP per capita. In addition, govspend
bears a negative and highly significant coefficient in most of the specifications. 
This result is in accordance with previous studies and policy reports indicating 
that larger government spending tends to be associated with lower levels of
income inequality (see e.g. Barr, 1992; Mahler and Jesuit, 2006; OECD, 2008). 
Finally, the coefficient of primschool is positive and significant at a level of 95 
percent highlighting the positive impact of primary schooling on income 
inequality. This puzzling -at a first glance- result could be explained if we take 
into account the large number of developing countries in our sample. Since in 
most of these countries a large part of the population is totally illiterate, increased 
primary schooling widens the income gap between educated and totally illiterate 
population. On the other hand, secschool, tertschooland and openness appear to 
be non significant in most of the specifications.
In columns (5) to (8), Table 1, Gini_Solt is regressed on index_labour as well 
as on the same set of control variables. As can be verified, index_labour enters 
again with a negative coefficient which remains significant at a level of 99 percent 
in all the alternative specifications. Our finding suggests that the negative effect of 
increased employment protection on income inequality is robust to alternative 
income inequality measures. Moreover, our findings concerning the rest of the 
explanatory variables remain qualitatively intact. 
[Table 2, here]
In Table 2, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results by 
investigating whether the negative impact of increased employment protection on 
income inequality survives under alternative specifications and estimation 
techniques. To this end, in columns (2) and (6) we re-estimate our “benchmark” 
equations presented in columns (1) and (4) respectively by excluding the 10 
                                                
7 Under the hypothesis that the associated labour adjustment costs are relatively more important 
for unskilled workers.
8 A simulation that calculates the percentage increase in the 90-10 differential which is correlated 
with one standard-deviation reduction in rigidity.
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percent of the outliers from our sample. This allows us to investigate whether our 
findings are driven by some outlier observations.9 In turn, in columns (3) and (7) 
we proceed by estimating the basic equations without the set of geographical 
dummies. This allows us to examine whether the inclusion of geographical 
dummies lie behind our empirical findings. 
As can be easily verified, index_labour bears a negative and significant 
coefficient in all the specifications highlighting that the negative effect of 
increased employment protection on income inequality remains highly robust to 
several alternative specifications. As far as the rest of the explanatory variables 
are concerned, our empirical findings remain qualitatively intact.
Finally, in columns (4) and (8) we seek to tackle the potential reverse causality 
problem between employment protection and income inequality. Reverse 
causality may arise because higher income inequality provokes people to ask for
more employment protection. According to this rationale, the direction of the 
causality may goes from income inequality to employment protection and not the 
other way round. In order to manage this, in columns (4) and (8) we employ an 
instrumental variables approach. Particularly, we use as instruments for 
employment protection: (i) the level of democracy (denoted as democracy), (ii)
the political orientation the chief executive and the largest party in congress
(denoted as left_center_orient) and (iii) a dummy capturing whether an economy 
is characterized by a common law legal system (denoted as legor_uk). 
Our choice concerning the set of instruments employed has been based on 
empirical studies examining the determinants of labour regulations (see e.g. 
Botero et al., 2004). According to Botero et al. (2004), labour regulation across 
countries can be explained by: (i) efficiency considerations, (ii) political power 
theories, and (iii) legal theories. Efficiency theory focuses on a choice of a 
combination of regulations by an efficiency criterion (Demsetz, 1967; North, 
1981). In this case government uses a set of labour market interventions to 
maximize social welfare by curing market failures. According to political power 
theories, institutions are designed to transfer resources from those out of political 
power to those in power (Olson, 1993). Concerning labour market, regulations 
protecting workers are introduced by socialist, social-democratic, and more 
generally leftist governments to benefit their political constituencies (Hicks, 
1999). Legal theories suggest that the enforcement of the labour regulations is 
provided by the legal traditions of each country (Djankov et al., 2003b). In 
accordance with that, common law countries that tend to rely on markets and 
contracts should regulate labour market less.10 Finally, dictatorships are less 
                                                
9 We assume that our “benchmark” equations are those presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 
which are identical to those reported in columns (4) and (8) of Table 1. 
10
Common law emerged in England and is mostly characterized by the importance of 
decisionmaking by juries, independent judges, and judicial discretion as opposed to codes. 
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constrained than democratically elected governments, and therefore will have 
more redistributive laws and institutions. Constitutions, legislative constraints, 
and other forms of checks and balances are all conducive to fewer regulations 
(Djankov et al., 2002).
Estimation method is two-stage least squares (2SLS) with geographical 
dummies and robust standard errors. First stage results are reported in the upper 
part of columns (4) and (8) whereas the results of the second stage are reported 
below. As can be verified our results concerning employment protection remain 
qualitatively identical to those presented in other columns. Moreover, we note that 
we have performed a Hausman test in order to compare the 2SLS with the simple 
OLS model. The Hausman test showed that there are no systematic differences 
between the two models and therefore we can proceed by keeping the simple OLS 
model as a basis in our analysis.11
[Table 3, here]
In Table 3, instead of the general employment protection variable 
index_labour, we employ interchangeably the four sub-indices of employment 
protection described in detail in Section 3.2.2. More precisely, in column (1) 
Tex_Gini is regressed on the dismissal procedures measure (index_dism) as well 
as on the standard set of controls following identical empirical methodology to 
that employed in Table1, whereas in columns (2) to (4) we include 
interchangeably the cost of increasing hours worked index (cost_overtimen) 
[column (2)], the cost of firing workers (cost_firing) [column (3)] and the 
alternative employment contracts index (altern_contract) [column (4)]. As can be 
easily verified, index_dism and cost_overtimen bear negative and highly 
significant coefficients whereas the coefficient on cost_firing although negative 
appears to be marginally insignificant. On the other hand,  altern_contract enters 
with a positive coefficient which is significant at a level of 90 percent. 
These empirical findings suggest that the negative impact of increased 
employment protection on income inequality verified in Table 1, is mainly driven 
by the employment protection legislation related to the dismissal procedures and 
the cost of increasing hours worked. As far as the rest of the controls are 
concerned, we observe that our results remain similar to those presented in Table 
1. Both gdppercap and govspend enter again with a negative and significant 
coefficient in most of the specifications. The only remarkable difference is that in 
                                                                                                                                     
Common law was transmitted to the British colonies, including Australia, Canada, India, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, and a number of countries in the Caribbean, East Africa, and 
Southeast Asia. (Djankov et al, 2003)
11 The results obtained from the Hausman test are available upon request.
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Table 3 the primschool loses its significance and tertschool bears a negative and 
highly significant coefficient in all the specifications. 
4.2 Examining the effect of informal sector on employment protection-income 
inequality nexus.
The existence of unofficial economy generates several malfunctions in the 
operation of the markets and distorts the results of implemented policies (see e.g.
Cuff et al., 2011; Almeida and Carneiro; 2007).
A branch of the literature focuses on the effects of increased protection on the 
demand for labour in the formal sector (see e.g.  Cuff et al., 2011; Dabla-Norris et 
al., 2008). According to this rationale formal jobs become more expensive for the 
firms and this generates an incentive for the entrepreneurs to move to the informal 
sector. The contraction of demand for labour in the formal sector and the 
corresponding increase in demand in the informal sector affects both the wage 
dispersion and the employment in the formal sector and therefore is also expected 
to affect the overall effect of EPL on income inequality. Concerning the labour 
supply side,  Harris and Todaro (1970), Fields (1975) and Almeida and Carneiro 
(2007) underline the importance of increased enforcement of mandated benefits to
the willingness to be employed in the formal sector and therefore to labour supply 
in the formal.
To determine whether the size of the informal sector affects the relationship 
between EPL and income inequality we follow the strategy of Dutt and Mitra 
(2002). Namely; we introduce in our basic specification interaction terms in order 
to examine whether the size of the shadow economy affects the impact of 
employment protection on income inequality. More precisely, we introduce the 
multiplicative variable index_labour*shadow where shadow is the size of the 
informal economy measure developed by Schneider et al. (2010). Shadow
measures the size of the informal economy as a share of GDP and -in our sample-
ranges from a minimum value of 0.08 (in the case of Switzerland) to a maximum 
of 0.67 (in the case of Bolivia).12
By introducing these interaction terms we allow the effect of index_labour to 
vary across countries characterized by different sizes of the informal sector. 
According to our theoretical priors, the coefficient of the interaction term has to
be positive and significant. Moreover, standard calculus tells us that the turning 
point in the data is given by the coefficient of index_labour divided by the 
coefficient of the interaction term index_labour*shadow. This method allows us 
                                                
12 According to Schneider et al. (2010) shadow economy includes all market-based legal 
production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to 
avoid: 1) payment of income, value added or other taxes, 2) payment of social security 
contributions and 3) having to meet certain legal labour market standards.
10
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to examine first whether a change in the sign of index_labour indeed exists and 
also to determine it endogenously. 
[Table 4, here]
The results of this experiment are presented on Table 4. In columns (1) to (4) 
Tex_Gini is regressed on index_labour, index_labour*shadow and as well as on 
the standard set of controls whereas in columns (5) to (8) we follow the same 
strategy by employing Gini_Solt as dependent variable. As can be easily verified, 
the coefficient of index_labour*shadow is positive and significant in all of the 
specifications. These findings are in line with the implications driven by our 
theoretical priors. Namely; in countries characterized by large informal sector the 
negative effect of increased employment protection on income inequality is 
mitigated and in some cases may also be reversed. 
What do these finding suggest about the effect of employment protection on 
income inequality in the real world? Focusing on the estimation presented in 
Column (4) of Table 4 we can calculate the estimated turning point on the effect 
of employment protection which is a value of shadow around 0.62.13 As can easily 
be verified this value is very close to the maximum value of shadow in our sample 
which equals to 0.67. Therefore, we conclude that in the real world the turning 
point for the coefficient of index_labour is rarely met. However, our empirical 
findings suggest that the size of informal economy does play a crucial role on the 
magnitude of the effect of employment protection on income inequality. 
Specifically, in countries characterized by small informal sectors the negative 
effect of employment protection on inequality is larger whereas in countries 
characterized by large informal sectors this effect is crucially mitigated and- in 
some extreme cases- even reversed. 
[Table 5, here]
In Table 5, we replicate the same experiment for the four sub-indices of 
employment protection (i.e. index_dism, cost_overtimen, cost_firing, 
altern_contract). Specifically, we construct four alternative interaction terms (one 
for each specific sub-component of employment protection) and then we regress 
Tex_Gini and Gini_Solt on the employment protection sub-indices as well as their 
corresponding interaction terms following identical estimation methodology to 
that employed in Table 4. As can be easily verified, all alternative interaction 
terms enter with a positive and significant coefficient in most of the 
specifications. These results are in line with the key message of Table 4. Namely, 
                                                
13 The turning point in the data is given by the coefficient of index_labour divided by the 
coefficient of the interaction term index_labour*shadow.
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in countries characterized by large informal sector the negative effect of increased 
employment protection on income inequality is mitigated and in some cases may 
also be reversed.
What is more important with the empirical findings reported in Table 5, is that 
the predicted turning point on the effect of specific sub-categories of employment 
protection on income inequality, can be met in the real world. That is, our model 
suggests that in the presence of large informal sector, specific forms of 
employment protection may exert a positive impact on income inequality. This is 
the case -for example- for cost_overtime and firing_cost. Focusing on the 
estimation presented in column (2) we can calculate the estimated turning point on 
the effect of the cost of increasing hours worked index (cost_overtimen) which is 
a value of shadow around 0.5. Similarly, based on the results reported in columns 
(3) and (7), the estimated turning point on the effect of the cost of firing workers 
(firing_cost) is a value of shadow around 0.35-0.45. A value of shadow around 
0.45 appears to be highly realistic for our group of countries. Thus, our model 
suggests that specific forms of employment protection may have a positive impact 
on income inequality, in countries characterized by large unofficial economies. 
5. Conclusions
One of the questions we tried to address in this paper was whether 
employment protection legislation is an efficient way of narrowing the gap 
between the rich and the unfortunate ones. By employing employment protection 
data developed by Botero et al. (2004), along with two different measures of 
income inequality for a sample of 83 developed and developing countries, we 
concluded that employment protection legislation has a negative impact on 
income inequality. This relationship remained highly robust across several 
different specifications and estimation methods. Furthermore, our analysis 
proceeded with investigating how that relationship is affected by the extent of the 
informal economy. Our results suggested that in the presence of a large unofficial 
economy the negative effect of employment protection legislation on inequality is 
crucially mitigated and in some extreme cases may also be reversed.
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Table 1: The Effect of Employment Protection on Income Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tex_
Gini
Tex_Gi
ni
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
index_labour
-
4.895
**
-
7.012**
*
-
7.221
***
-
6.732
***
-
16.83
1***
-
14.34
6***
-
12.57
8***
-
13.91
5***
(-
2.159
) (-3.001)
(-
3.092
)
(-
2.727
)
(-
4.324
)
(-
3.686
)
(-
3.107
)
(-
3.592
)
gdppercap -
0.001
***
-
0.001**
*
-
0.001
***
-
0.001
***
-
0.001
***
-
0.001
***
-
0.001
**
-
0.001
***
(-
6.528
) (-4.754)
(-
2.880
)
(-
2.965
)
(-
6.507
)
(-
3.936
)
(-
2.407
)
(-
3.555
)
govspend -
0.232**
*
-
0.206
***
-
0.181
***
-
0.363
***
-
0.316
***
-
0.230
***
(-5.549)
(-
4.996
)
(-
3.410
)
(-
4.610
)
(-
4.117
)
(-
2.866
)
pimschool 0.098
***
0.088
**
0.205
***
0.206
***
(2.99
9)
(2.58
8)
(2.79
3)
(2.77
4)
secschool -
0.039
*
-
0.028
-
0.065
-
0.108
(-
1.865
)
(-
0.900
)
(-
1.295
)
(-
1.537
)
tertschool -
0.015 0.159
(-
0.264
)
(1.49
2)
openness -
0.017
-
0.043
(-
0.692
)
(-
1.374
)
Geographical yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.  
Dummies
obs 70 65 64 64 83 77 76 76
R2 0.53 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.47 0.58 0.66 0.68
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Table 2: The Effect of Employment Protection on Income Inequality [Sensitivity 
Analysis]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_Gini
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_Solt
First 
Stage 
Results
First Stage 
Results
left_center_o
rient 0.121* 0.067
(1.91) (1.21)
democracy -0.006 -0.006
(-1.02) (-1.38)
legor_uk -0.174*** -0.187***
(-3.26) (-3.95)
Second 
Stage 
Results
Second 
Stage 
Results
index_labour
-
6.732
***
-
7.301
***
-
6.03
8** -11.598*
-
13.91
5***
-
13.13
0***
-
11.15
2*** -28.965***
(-
2.727
)
(-
2.885
)
(-
2.33
4) (-1.935)
(-
3.592
)
(-
3.239
)
(-
2.697
) (-3.063)
gdppercap -
0.001
***
-
0.001
***
-
0.00
1*** -0.001**
-
0.001
***
-
0.001
***
-
0.001
*** -0.001***
(-
2.965
)
(-
3.272
)
(-
3.79
2) (-2.547)
(-
3.555
)
(-
3.149
)
(-
3.436
) (-2.879)
govspend -
0.181
***
-
0.184
***
-
0.09
1 -0.189***
-
0.230
***
-
0.238
***
-
0.117 -0.222**
(-
3.410
)
(-
3.283
)
(-
1.48
5) (-2.882)
(-
2.866
)
(-
2.790
)
(-
1.562
) (-2.138)
pimschool 0.088
**
0.076
**
0.07
6* 0.100**
0.206
***
0.265
***
0.153
* 0.268***
(2.58
8)
(2.12
8)
(1.92
0) (2.205)
(2.77
4)
(3.95
2)
(1.97
2) (4.227)
secschool
-
0.028
-
0.027
-
0.04
0 -0.029
-
0.108
-
0.148
**
-
0.134
** -0.110*
(-
0.900
(-
0.851
(-
1.29 (-0.859)
(-
1.537
(-
2.509
(-
2.156 (-1.852)
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Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, 1%.  3). In Equations (2) and (6) we exclude 10 per cent of the outliers from the sample 4)
Equations (3) and (7) is estimated without geographical dummies. 5) Equations (4) and (8) are estimated 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). First stage results are reported in the upper part of each column, 
whereas the results of the second stage are presented below.
) ) 0) ) ) )
tertschool
-
0.015
-
0.013
-
0.02
2 0.011 0.159
0.194
* 0.053 0.238**
(-
0.264
)
(-
0.220
)
(-
0.55
4) (0.165)
(1.49
2)
(1.95
1)
(0.61
1) (2.091)
openness
-
0.017
-
0.036
-
0.03
2 -0.012
-
0.043
-
0.056
-
0.070
** -0.031
(-
0.692
)
(-
1.294
)
(-
1.33
5) (-0.562)
(-
1.374
)
(-
1.551
)
(-
2.218
) (-0.868)
Geographical 
Dummies
yes yes no yes yes yes no yes
obs 64 60 64 64 76 69 76 74
R2 0.71 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.60 0.64
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Table 3: The Effect of Employment Protection on Income Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
index_dism
-
4.187
***
-
8.317
***
(-
3.213
)
(-
3.196)
cost_overtime
-
3.721
***
-
7.507
***
(-
2.761
)
(-
3.892)
firing_cost
-
3.992 -2.967
(-
1.560
)
(-
0.659)
altern_contract
5.61
3* 6.306
(1.71
6)
(1.422
)
gdppercap
-
0.001
**
-
0.001
-
0.001
**
-
0.00
1
-
0.001
**
-
0.001
*
-
0.001
**
-
0.001
*
(-
2.892
)
(-
2.303
)
(-
2.684
)
(-
1.86
3)
(-
3.628)
(-
2.363)
(-
3.072)
(-
2.488)
govspend 0.081
**
0.078
**
0.075
**
0.04
3
0.209
***
0.191
***
0.211
***
0.201
***
(2.46
0)
(2.53
2)
(2.47
0)
(1.24
6)
(2.919
)
(2.687
)
(3.001
)
(2.976
)
pimschool
-
0.031
-
0.025
-
0.018
-
0.01
3 -0.107 -0.106 -0.110 -0.103
(-
1.003
)
(-
0.810
)
(-
0.593
)
(-
0.46
1)
(-
1.593)
(-
1.511)
(-
1.497)
(-
1.433)
secschool -
0.039
-
0.014
-
0.049
-
0.09 0.104 0.159 0.090 0.040
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Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.  
5*
(-
0.691
)
(-
0.216
)
(-
0.825
)
(-
1.69
4)
(1.025
)
(1.519
)
(0.867
)
(0.401
)
tertschool -
0.183
***
-
0.174
***
-
0.186
***
-
0.17
7***
-
0.210
***
-
0.240
***
-
0.213
**
-
0.213
***
(-
3.313
)
(-
3.315
)
(-
3.462
)
(-
3.18
5)
(-
2.944)
(-
2.782)
(-
2.494)
(-
2.659)
openness
-
0.025
-
0.004
-
0.023
-
0.01
8
-
0.065
** -0.010 -0.050 -0.040
(-
1.063
)
(-
0.174
)
(-
0.937
)
(-
0.78
4)
(-
2.092)
(-
0.311)
(-
1.447)
(-
1.180)
Geographical 
Dummies
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 64 64 64 64 76 76 76 76
R2 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.64
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Table 4: The Effect of Shadow Economy on Income Inequality, Employment 
Protection Nexus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
index_labour
-
18.29
2***
-
11.28
6***
-
10.99
7***
-
10.68
1***
-
33.39
4***
-
22.14
9***
-
21.58
7***
-
20.66
0***
(-
5.183
)
(-
3.496
)
(-
4.016
)
(-
3.798
)
(-
6.392
)
(-
4.269
)
(-
4.685
)
(-
4.307
)
index_labour*shadow 43.04
7***
15.76
8*
14.39
4*
16.89
4**
52.37
7***
26.02
0*
31.48
9**
26.39
7*
(5.75
4)
(1.71
6)
(1.76
5)
(2.45
8)
(4.72
4)
(1.69
9)
(2.37
6)
(1.98
4)
gdppercap -
0.001
**
-
0.001
-
0.001
-
0.001
*
-
0.001
-
0.001
(-
2.623
)
(-
1.554
)
(-
1.364
)
(-
1.887
)
(-
0.483
)
(-
1.234
)
govspend -
0.208
***
-
0.184
***
-
0.169
***
-
0.315
***
-
0.248
***
-
0.198
**
(-
5.585
)
(-
4.613
)
(-
3.264
)
(-
3.748
)
(-
2.874
)
(-
2.303
)
pimschool 0.092
***
0.079
**
0.219
***
0.214
***
(2.98
7)
(2.54
7)
(2.90
1)
(2.80
8)
secschool -
0.040
*
-
0.016
-
0.082
-
0.097
(-
1.916
)
(-
0.567
)
(-
1.580
)
(-
1.429
)
tertschool -
0.061 0.078
(-
1.182
)
(0.86
3)
19
Gkinni and Vasilaki: Employment Protection and Income Inequality: Is there a role for
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2013
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significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.  
openness -
0.014
-
0.034
(-
0.605
)
(-
1.192
)
Geographical 
Dummies
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 70 65 64 64 83 77 76 76
R2 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.46 0.60 0.69 0.70
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Table 5: The Effect of Shadow Economy on Income Inequality, Employment 
Protection Nexus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Tex_
Gini
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
Gini_
Solt
index_dism
-
8.837
***
-
16.96
5***
(-
3.506
)
(-
4.100)
index_dism*shado
w
13.15
3**
25.05
0**
(2.33
1)
(2.491
)
cost_overtime
-
7.373
***
-
9.818
***
(-
2.821
)
(-
3.673)
cost_overtime*sha
dow
14.32
4* 7.973
(1.93
4)
(0.986
)
firing_cost
-
8.391
**
-
10.63
6*
(-
2.413
)
(-
1.670)
firing_cost*shado
w
16.64
1**
31.84
4**
(2.53
0)
(2.250
)
altern_contract
1.51
0 -3.275
(0.40
8)
(-
0.590)
altern_contract*sh
adow
12.3
64**
*
28.34
7***
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Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.  
(3.15
0)
(2.766
)
gdppercap
-
0.001
*
-
0.001
-
0.001
-
0.00
1
-
0.001
** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-
1.927
)
(-
0.975
)
(-
1.549
)
(-
0.83
7)
(-
2.003)
(-
1.386)
(-
1.125)
(-
0.237)
govspend 0.076
**
0.077
**
0.067
**
0.03
7
0.214
***
0.198
***
0.216
***
0.203
***
(2.38
8)
(2.64
5)
(2.49
3)
(1.03
9)
(2.890
)
(2.698
)
(2.999
)
(2.914
)
pimschool
-
0.025
-
0.020
-
0.002
-
0.00
3 -0.100 -0.105 -0.086 -0.086
(-
0.861
)
(-
0.705
)
(-
0.086
)
(-
0.09
8)
(-
1.556)
(-
1.499)
(-
1.219)
(-
1.218)
secschool
-
0.064
-
0.048
-
0.094
*
-
0.12
6** 0.042 0.136 -0.004 -0.039
(-
1.215
)
(-
0.834
)
(-
1.737
)
(-
2.17
2)
(0.480
)
(1.275
)
(-
0.049)
(-
0.425)
tertschool -
0.171
***
-
0.169
***
-
0.176
***
-
0.16
8***
-
0.166
**
-
0.233
**
-
0.174
**
-
0.186
**
(-
3.099
)
(-
3.400
)
(-
3.341
)
(-
3.11
0)
(-
2.139)
(-
2.613)
(-
2.010)
(-
2.306)
openness
-
0.023
-
0.003
-
0.018
-
0.01
6
-
0.061
** -0.006 -0.039 -0.033
(-
1.019
)
(-
0.131
)
(-
0.792
)
(-
0.72
6)
(-
2.127)
(-
0.200)
(-
1.224)
(-
1.036)
Geographical 
Dummies
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 64 64 64 64 76 76 76 76
R2 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.68
22
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 10 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol10/iss1/11
Appendix A: Variable descriptions
Variables Description of variables Source
Tex_Gini Gini coefficient developed by Texas 
University Inequality Project (2003)
Texas University 
Inequality 
Project (2003)
Gini_Solt Gini coefficient developed by Solt 
(2009)
Solt (2009)
index_labour Employment laws index; Measures the 
protection of labour and employment 
laws as the average of (1) Alternative 
employment contracts, (2) Cost of 
increasing hours worked, (3) Cost of 
firing workers and (4) Dismissal 
procedures. 
Botero et al. 
(2004)
index_dism Dismissal procedures index; Measures 
worker protection granted by law or 
mandatory collective agreements against 
dismissal. It is the average of the 
following seven dummy variables which 
equal one: (1) if the employer must 
notify a third party before dismissing 
more than one worker, (2) if the 
employer needs the approval of a third 
party prior to dismissing more than one 
worker, (3) if the employer must notify a 
third party before dismissing one 
redundant worker, (4) if the employer 
needs the approval of a third party to 
dismiss one redundant worker, (5) if the 
employer must provide relocation or 
retraining alternatives for redundant 
employees prior to dismissal, (6) if there 
are priority rules applying to dismissal or 
lay-offs, and (7) if there are priority rules 
applying to re-employment
Botero et al. 
(2004)
firing_cost Cost of firing workers; Measures the 
cost of firing 20 percent of the firm’s 
workers (10% are fired for redundancy 
and 10% without cause). The cost of 
Botero et al. 
(2004)
23
Gkinni and Vasilaki: Employment Protection and Income Inequality: Is there a role for
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2013
firing a worker is calculated as the sum 
of the notice period, severance pay, and 
any mandatory penalties established by 
law or mandatory collective agreements 
for a worker with three years of tenure 
with the firm. If dismissal is illegal, we 
set the cost of firing equal to the annual 
wage. The new wage bill incorporates 
the normal wage of the remaining 
workers and the cost of firing workers.  
The cost of firing workers is computed as 
the ratio of the new wage bill to the old 
one.
altern_contract Alternative employment contracts;
Measures the existence and cost of 
alternatives to the standard employment 
contract, computed as the average of: (1) 
a dummy variable equal to one if part-
time workers enjoy the mandatory 
benefits of full-time workers; (2) a 
dummy variable equal to one if 
terminating part-time workers is at least 
as costly as terminating full time 
workers; (3) a dummy variable equal to 
one if fixed-term contracts are only 
allowed for fixed-term tasks; and (4) the 
normalized maximum duration of fixed-
term contracts.
Botero et al. 
(2004)
cost_overtime Cost of increasing hours worked; It 
measures of the cost of increasing the 
number of hours worked are used by 
calculating the "maximum number of 
hours of work in a year before overtime" 
per year in each country (excluding 
overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.).  A 
firm first increases the number of hours 
worked until it reaches the country’s 
maximum normal hours of work, and 
then uses overtime. If existing employees 
are not allowed to increase the hours 
worked, perhaps because overtime is 
Botero et al. 
(2004)
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capped, Botero et al assume the firm 
doubles its workforce, doubling the wage 
bill of the firm.  The cost of increasing 
hours worked is computed as the ratio of 
the final wage bill to the initial one
openness Trade openness; the ratio of country's 
total trade, the sum 
of exports plus imports, to the 
country's gross domestic product, for the 
years 1980-2004.
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2010)
govspend Government spending; the level of 
government expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP, for the years 1980-2004.
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2010)
primschool Primary school enrollment as a 
percentage of the population of official 
primary education age.
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2010)
secschool Secondary school enrollment as a 
percentage of the population of official 
secondary education age.
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2010)
tertschool Tertiary school enrollment as a 
percentage of the population of official 
tertiary education age.
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2010)
ddppercap GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2010)
shadow Shadow Economy as a share of GDP Schneider et al 
(2010)
democracy Polity Democracy Index Polity IV (2004) 
Database
left_center_orient Chief executive and largest party in 
congress have left or center political 
orientation
Botero et al. 
(2004)
legor_uk British Legal Origin La Porta et al. 
(2008)
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics
The means, standard errors, minimum observations, and maximum observations 
for the variables are summarized in the following table: 
Variables Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Max
Tex_Gini 70 41.35 5.606 28.48 53.27
Gini_Solt
83 37.91 9.480 22.50 61.57
index_labour 83 0.48 0.193 0.14 0.82
index_dism 83 0.43 0.281 0.00 0.85
firing_cost 83 0.46 0.211 0.00 1.00
altern_contract 83 0.60 0.187 0.00 0.96
cost_overtime 83 0.45 0.435 0.00 1.00
openness 83 58.19 40.302 15.07 293.33
govspend 77 28.96 10.685 8.77 56.38
primschool 82 99.69 15.306 33.63 138.61
secschool 82 72.43 30.919 5.04 149.73
tertschool 82 25.81 17.711 0.42 79.28
gdppercap 83 7251.535 8973.196 141.34 32321.34
shadow 83 0.31 0. 146 0. 08 0.67
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